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ABSTRACT 
Most philosophical accounts on scientific theories are affected by three dogmas or 
ingrained attitudes. These dogmas have led philosophers to choose between analyz-
ing the internal structure of theories or their historical evolution. In this paper, I turn 
these three dogmas upside down. I argue (i) that mathematical practices are not 
epistemically neutral, (ii) that the morphology of theories can be very complex, and 
(iii) that one should view theoretical knowledge as the combination of internal factors 
and their intrinsic historicity. 
______________________________________  
1. INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER 
Philosophy of science has been often concerned with, at times even obsessed 
by, scientific theories. As the crowning achievements of scientific research, theories 
have continuously lured epistemologists and methodologists. Or at least so it used 
to be. In recent years, the philosophical analysis of scientific theories has lost much 
of its appeal and it is now considerably less popular than it was in the past.  In this 1
paper, I argue that the fading of interest in theories is related to the failure of the 
traditional accounts, which, in turn, is the result of three ingrained assumptions, or 
dogmas, on the nature and the role of scientific theories. I claim (i) that these as-
sumptions have shaped virtually all philosophical views of theories, and (ii) that 
they prevent the elaboration of an account able to do justice to scientific practices 
present and past. 
 For a discussion of this point see (Morrison 2007).1
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My argument consists of three steps. First, I discuss a general attitude in philos-
ophy of science, which I call the Whewell thesis. This thesis expresses the cultural 
climate that allowed the three dogmas to thrive. Next, I proceed to elaborate more 
precise statements of the dogmas and to show how they permeate our philosophi-
cal views of theories. Finally, I bring forward my alternative. I argue that the philo-
sophical project of proposing a full-fledged “theory of theories” is hopeless from 
the start. My suggestion is to frame a flexible workspace to use reflectively the the-
oretical knowledge already accumulated. By systematically overturning the dog-
mas, I hold that one should focus upon the epistemic cooperation between three 
theoretical dimensions: the representational, the transformational, and the ex-
planatory dimension. My proposed workspace facilitates the conceptualization  of 
the epistemic cooperation, but it does not provide for the details. A precise ac-
count of the production of theoretical knowledge is not a task for philosophical ar-
guments alone, but it requires case-specific analyses combining cognitive science, 
psychology, philosophy of mind, epistemology, sociology, history of science, and 
so on. 
Before starting my discussion, I need to lay out two provisos. First, here I am 
mainly concerned with theories in physics and chemistry. More generally, I focus 
upon theories that represent symbolically the world and deploy practices to ma-
nipulate these symbolic representations. Since an important part of my argument 
hinges on the role of mathematical practices, I deal with theories in which mathe-
matics plays a substantial role. Second, my approach hinges on the fact that theo-
ries are knowledge producers i.e. they yield a particular kind of knowledge called 
theoretical knowledge. I suspect that practical knowledge—say the form of knowl-
edge associated with the use of material tools, hand-on practices, or direct experi-
ence—can be included in my approach, but this is not my main goal at this stage. 
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2. THE WHEWELL THESIS 
One of my claims is that the three dogmas are the three-fold expression of 
philosophers’ intellectualistic attitude toward theories. Traditionally, theories have 
been considered as objects of thought and a neat separation has been drawn be-
tween theories and their manipulations, applications, and specifications. I call this 
attitude the Whewell thesis. I choose to refer to William Whewell because he offers 
one of the tersest expressions of this intellectualism. His formulation will guide us 
to a precise statement of the dogmas. 
The Whewell thesis lurks in some passages of his treatise on Astronomy and 
General Physics written for the Bridgewater series. The point of the whole book—
and of the whole series of treatises, in fact—is to argue against the rampant French 
positivism and especially against the attempt at explaining nature without any di-
vinity or divine designer. A step of Whewell’s complex argument is to show that 
faith can cooperate with reason to produce genuine progress. From this perspec-
tive, the most revealing dualism is between Isaac Newton, the confident believer 
and Pierre Simon Laplace, the outspoken atheist. The superiority of the former over 
the latter follows from the different epistemological weight of their contributions to 
celestial mechanics. Newton is the discoverer of the laws of dynamics and the law 
of gravitation. Despite the fact that these laws “occupy little room in their state-
ment”, they contain all the knowledge that natural philosophy can possibly yield. 
Laplace, and other countrymen of his, extended the theory and applied these laws 
to the motion of the planets and their satellites. Although such extension is unde-
niably complex, requires a great deal of ingenuity, and at times it leads to epoch-
making feats such as the “proof” of the stability of the solar system, still, it does not 
add a single grain of original knowledge: 
In explaining, as the great [French] mathematicians just mentioned have 
done, the phenomena of the solar system by means of the law of universal 
gravitation, the conclusions at which they arrived were really included in the 
truth of the law, whatever skill and sagacity it might require to develop and 
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extricate them from the general principle. (Whewell 1837, 328 emphasis 
added) 
While Newton gave us a genuinely new body of knowledge that illuminates the 
innermost secrets of the universe, Laplace and his colleagues merely unfolded the 
treasures incapsulated into the laws of dynamics and gravitation. Later in his book, 
Whewell stresses this point even more emphatically: 
When, therefore, we consider the mathematicians who are employed in suc-
cessfully applying the mechanical philosophy, as men well deserving of 
honor from those who take an interest in the progress of science, we do 
rightly; but it is still to be recollected, that in doing this they are not carrying 
us to any higher point of view in the knowledge of nature than we had at-
tained before: they are only unfolding the consequences, which were al-
ready virtually in our possession. (Whewell 1837, 332-333) 
These passages of Whewell’s book summarize an epistemological attitude that, I 
argue, has been more or less tacitly accepted by any philosopher who has reflect-
ed on the nature and the function of scientific theories. This attitude can be articu-
lated in three theses or dogmas. The first dogma is the following: 
(D1) There is an epistemic asymmetries between the parts a theory consists 
in. More specifically, the whole knowledge content of a theory is stored in 
a handful of fundamental laws, while the mathematical techniques used 
to put these laws to work on concrete cases are epistemically neutral. 
This point, which Whewell takes for granted, is the foundation of his whole ar-
gument. Once we have the fundamental laws, truth is “virtually in our possession” 
and the mathematical machinery just unearths what is implicit in the laws. There is 
no epistemic contribution of the mathematical practices. The second dogma reads: 
(D2) Theories present a core-belt morphology. In other words, we distin-
guish (i) a core of unrejectable statements that make the theory what it is 
and (ii) a set of auxiliary assumptions, concepts, methods, models, and 
techniques which can be sacrificed to increase the fitting between theory 
and experience. 
The second dogma draws a clear line, as Whewell does, between those parts of 
the theory which are established once and for all and those parts that, although 
important, can be adjusted or even sacrificed for a better agreement with experi-
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ments. Thus, one of the reasons of Newton’s superiority is that the laws of dynamics 
and gravitation will remain with us forever. On the contrary, in unfolding the knowl-
edge packed in this theoretical core, Laplace and his colleagues introduced as-
sumptions, concepts, techniques, and models that can be jettisoned without any 
traumatic blow for the theory itself if further experience forces us to do so. The 
third dogma is deceptively simpler than the previous two and can be formulated in 
the following manner: 
(D3) Theories are taken as a given. 
Obviously, (D3) needs some elaboration. There are two major aspects of a scien-
tific theory that a philosopher should account for: its internal structure and its tem-
poral development. Ideally, a good philosophical conception of theories should 
inform us about how the various components of a theory stay together, how they 
depend on one another, and how they cooperate to produce knowledge. Addi-
tionally, since theories are human products subject to historical evolution, we also 
need to know how theories are modified, enlarged, accepted, disseminated, con-
futed, or rejected by different communities at different times. Both the structural 
and the historical aspects concur to illuminate that human artifact we call scientific 
theory. My claim is that traditional philosophical accounts drop systematically one 
or the other aspect and therefore treat theories, partially, as a given. Thus, dogma 
(D3) above can be explicated in terms of the two following theses: 
(D3.1) Philosophical accounts analyzing the internal structure of scientific 
theories, tend to overlook their temporal evolution and to consider them 
as a-temporal objects. They take theories as a historical given. 
(D3.2) Philosophical accounts analyzing the temporal evolution of scientific 
theories tend to assume a minimal internal structure—more precisely, the 
core-belt morphology of dogma (D2). They take theories as a structural 
given. 
I submit that a satisfactory philosophical account of scientific theories should 
represent the temporal evolution of a theory as a structural object, the modification 
of the relations between its parts, the integration of new ingredients, and so on. 
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There are relations between the three dogmas. Dogma (D1) separates out what 
is epistemically fundamental and what is epistemically neutral in a theory. Thus, it 
concerns the distribution of knowledge within a theory. Dogma (D2) follows the 
same separation strategy, but introduces an intermediate grey zone. For instance, 
the laws of dynamics and gravitation represent the epistemic substance of Newton-
ian mechanics, while the mathematical techniques used to manipulate them do not 
add a single bit of knowledge. However, there are numerous assumptions, hy-
potheses, models, which enrich Newton’s law in specific cases, but are not as es-
sential. In the calculation of the motion of a planet it might be necessary to assume 
that its aphelion is immobile. This assumption does not inform us on the essence of 
the motion, but on its accidental circumstances. If the hypothesis does not help 
solve the problem, it can be dropped. In brief, (D2) deals with the internal structure 
of a theory. Thus, (D1) and (D2) combine to depict theories as structures composed 
of essential features, accidental features, and neutral mathematical practices. 
The third dogma prescribes the way to approach the structure outlined by (D1) 
and (D2) and imposes a further distinction. It discriminates between the synchronic 
and diachronic analysis of the relation between the theoretical parts. The former is 
the investigation of the core and the belt in terms of their constituents and their re-
lations. This investigation lays down a structural description that holds for any theo-
ry at any time.  By contrast, the latter is concerned with the way in which the belt 2
changes over time given the unrejectable core. As a result, a diachronic analysis 
yields a description of the theory evolution over time that holds for any core and 
any belt. 
 Note that it does not need to be a description of all theories ever produced. This analysis focuses 2
upon what a theory ought to be i.e. the theory at its final stage of perfection.
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3. PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS ON THEORIES 
3.1 Preliminary Considerations 
Traditional philosophical accounts on scientific theories have interiorized the 
three dogmas (D1), (D2), and (D3). I do not have the space here for a systematic 
discussion of the entire philosophical literature. My argument consists in a swift 
survey and in displaying some textual evidence of the pervading presence of the 
three dogmas. Before starting, however, let me set the stage for this and the sub-
sequent discussion. 
I preliminarily distinguish between three kinds of epistemic jobs that we should 
expect performed by a theory. In the first place, a theory is supposed to give us a 
picture of the world populated with some sort of entities. One of the reasons why 
we frame theories is to represent our experience in symbolic terms. Mechanics 
paints the world as constituted by masses interacting by forces and possessing an-
gular momentum; electromagnetic theory relies on charges, electric and magnetic 
fields, dipole moments; general relativity introduces even more exoteric entities 
such as gravitational waves and black holes. Any theory has its say on the furniture 
of the universe. Secondly, a theory is also supposed to solve concrete problems 
and to yield predictions. This is accomplished by manipulating symbolic represen-
tations mentioned above to produce new representations. Equations of motion 
must be solved, critical behaviors must be approximated, probabilities must be 
calculated and all these problems call for special mathematical techniques. Finally, 
a theory is requested to produce explanations of phenomena, i.e. to make sense of 
our experience. Statistical mechanics tells us that thermal equilibrium is a proba-
bilistic event, general relativity interprets astronomical trajectories as space-time 
bending, electromagnetic theory presents optical phenomena as transverse vibra-
tions of electric and magnetic fields. These are the three dimensions of a scientific 
theory, which I call representational, transformational, and explanatory. 
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These functions are carried out by the various constituents of a theory. For in-
stance, fundamental laws such as the laws of dynamics, models, like the atomic 
model, ideal objects like the rigid body, concepts, like entropy, all concur to form a 
sort of picture about the external world. They tell us something about the furniture 
of the universe. Analogously, mathematical techniques, methods, procedures, 
tricks, algorithms allow us to manipulate our symbolic representations to produce 
applications to particular cases, predictions, and—generally speaking—other sym-
bolic representations. Note, however, that a clear distinction between the epis-
temic dimensions of a theory does not mean a compartmentation of its con-
stituents. While some theoretical constituents might serve eminently a function, 
they can also serve others at different times or in different contexts. For instance, 
the principle of conservation of energy tells us something about the world, but it 
might also be used as a calculation device. More importantly, I claim that theories 
produce knowledge by means of the epistemic cooperation between their con-
stituents, i.e. there is a sense—to be explored later—according to which each con-
stituent contributes to each dimension. 
An additional point to bear in mind is that my account aims at conceptualizing 
how historically concrete theories are assembled, work, and eventually change. 
Hence, I am not concerned with theories as abstract logical objects, but as a histor-
ical and social event embedded in a web of texts and practices. From this perspec-
tive, Clairaut’s theory of the Moon is given by all the ingredients appearing in the 
papers in which Clairaut develops his theory of the Moon. This is the reason why, in 
my account, Clairaut’s theory of the moon is not only the laws of dynamics and 
gravitation, but also all the mathematical techniques he uses. 
3.2 Permanence of the Dogmas 
For the time being, I postpone the discussion of the explanatory dimension and 
concentrate on the other two. Traditionally, the issue of explanation has been sepa-
rated from the problem of the nature of a scientific theory and, temporarily, I will 
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follow this usage. In this section I want to argue that the dogmas introduced above 
permeate philosophical reflections on the nature of scientific theories. I do not 
want to make a specific point in history of philosophy of science, though. This 
would require much more space and a much deeper discussion. I view the dogmas 
(D1)-(D3) much like religious dogmas. As such, they might have been held with 
shifting tenacity by different philosophers or even not held all at the same time. But 
they characterize by and large the philosophical approach to theories and their 
presence can be seen lingering over most of the influential views. At the beginning 
of the next section I offer another argument for the fundamentality of these dog-
mas. Here, I confine myself to a cursory overview of the main accounts. 
The acceptance of (D1) among philosophers of science is fairly uncontroversial, 
with some qualifications which I will discuss in a moment. Typically, philosophers 
do not see mathematical practices as making any epistemic difference and the rea-
son is not hard to see. In fact, most philosophers do not view those practices as a 
theoretical constituent at all. The—often implicit—argument goes that mathematical 
methods are imported into physical theory from pure mathematics and thereby 
adopted as a mere external aid to inference. A natural consequence of this argu-
ment is that, since mathematical practices are external to physical theories, they re-
veal deep connections between diverse fields and serve the purpose of unification 
(Morrison 2000). Thus, mathematical structures help establish relations between 
theories, but do not directly contribute to the epistemic content of the theory they 
feature in. Incidentally, besides being historically questionable, this argument does 
not entail the epistemic neutrality of mathematical practices. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of (D1), does not mean that philosophers have 
unanimously held that fundamental laws are the unique storage of the knowledge 
content of a theory. To be sure, the challenge of this common wisdom has carved 
out a moderate epistemological space for some mathematics. Ronald Giere, for 
instance, laments that philosophers have often missed the important role played 
by approximations in scientific practice: 
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Those scientists and philosophers who have taken it for granted that the 
laws of nature are well confirmed, general statements have obviously not 
been ignorant of the fact that scientists regularly use approximations. But 
they have taken this to be a relatively inconsequential fact about science. 
They have regarded the fact as a matter of only practical, not theoretical im-
portance. (Giere 1988, 78) 
Against this habit, Giere claims that fundamental laws are only schemes from 
which approximate models of physical systems are constructed. Approximations, 
therefore, are part and parcel with the process of producing knowledge. Nancy 
Cartwright pushes this line of argument even farther. She claims that fundamental 
laws are explanatory (in the usual D-N sense) to the extent that they are general 
and therefore literally not true of any special case. To give a truthful analysis of the 
phenomena, one needs to supplement fundamental laws with assumptions, ap-
proximations, and hypotheses that make the resulting phenomenological laws 
highly problem-oriented (Cartwright 1983). 
These reflections show a clear intention to go beyond the epistemic dominance 
of the fundamental laws, but still fall short of challenging the first dogma. In the first 
place, approximation techniques contain much more than just mathematics. In fact, 
it seems that Cartwright refers more specifically to those models and assumptions 
that represent the particular system under study. To apply Boltzmann’s transport 
equation to a certain fluid is not a matter of just mathematics, but also requires as-
sumptions on the behavior of the fluid. Furthermore, the mathematics of a theory is 
not limited to approximation techniques, but includes all the practiced used to 
manipulate symbols. Coordinate transformations or Fourier integrals are examples 
of these practices although they are not immediately useful to approximate fun-
damental laws. 
The core-belt morphology described in dogma (D2) is closely related to what 
Dudley Shapere dubbed the inviolability thesis: “the idea that there is something 
about the scientific (or, more generally, the knowledge-seeking or knowledge-ac-
quiring) enterprise that cannot be rejected or altered in the light of any other belief 
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at which we might arrive, but that, on the contrary, must be accepted before we 
can arrive, or perhaps even seek, such other beliefs” (Shapere 1984, xix-xx). Ac-
cording to Shapere, the inviolability thesis drives most philosophical investigations 
on theories. Logical Empiricism assumes this thesis when claims that there is a 
handful of propositions playing the role of axioms from which the other proposi-
tions of the theory can be logically derived.  Logical techniques, like mathematical 3
practices, are epistemically neutral. In the Semantic View, this idea is still central. 
The upholders of this approach  regard a theory as a collection of models but they 4
still consider some models as basic exemplars. As Giere shows, mechanics text-
books are organized around fundamental models such as the pendulum or the lin-
ear oscillator. These are the exemplars that must successively be enriched to repre-
sent real physical systems. 
Furthermore, the core-belt morphology is a pillar of virtually all history-oriented 
accounts of scientific theories. The reason is clear enough: according to this mor-
phology, the evolution of a theory over time is a combination of tradition—the un-
touchable core of the theory—and transformation—the refinement of the auxiliary 
assumptions. In this way, it is possible to talk about the same theory changing in 
time or, alternatively, a sequence of different theories belonging to the same re-
search program. This is the rationale of Lakatos’ approach (Lakatos 1978), and also 
Larry Laudan has followed basically the same strategy, although he allows for a cer-
tain rearrangement in the constituents of the core: 
During the evolution of any active research tradition, scientists learn more 
about the conceptual dependence and autonomy of its various elements; 
when it can be shown that certain elements, previously regarded as essential 
to the whole enterprise, can be jettisoned without compromising the prob-
lem-solving success of the tradition itself, these elements cease to be a part 
of the “unrejectable core”. (Laudan 1977, 100) 
 See for instance (Suppe 1977; Giere 2001; Mormann 2007).3
 Here I refer especially to (Suppe 1989).4
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Finally, dogma (D3). In the early decades of the 20th century, it was customary to 
treat theories as articulated bodies of linguistic and/or nonlinguistic objects kept 
together by relations of some formal nature. The fact that theories are historically 
situated entities in a socially organized world was supposed to play no role in 
philosophical analysis. The actual evolution of theories of the past was largely ig-
nored, while theories of the present, such as relativity and quantum mechanics, had 
to be explicated in terms of axioms, theoretical/observational language, corre-
spondence rules, models, isomorphism and so on. Thus, Newtonian mechanics 
was regarded as made of the three laws of dynamics, the law of gravitation and 
their logical consequences or, alternatively, of the models in which those laws are 
true. It was of no epistemological importance that those laws were not understood 
by Newton the way in which a 20th century philosopher of science would. Regard-
less if one sees theories as axiomatic systems of propositions or holds that “to ax-
iomatize is to define a set-theoretical predicates” (Suppes 1969), the philosophical 
analysis of the theoretical internal structure entails a pertinacious tendency to sep-
arate neatly between what a theory formally boils down to and how a theory came 
into being (Reichenbach 1938). 
There are good reasons for this tendency. A first reason is that by isolating a the-
ory as a well-defined object, philosophers are following a venerable scientific prac-
tice. Like scientists, they single out the relevant aspects of the phenomenon under 
study. Another reason is that the aim of philosophical inquiry is to elucidate what 
turns a set of propositions, models or other into a scientific theory irrespective of 
when and where the theory happens to be formulated. A ‘secret sauce’ for a scien-
tific theory cannot be time-, place-, or user-dependent. Sometimes this argument is 
phrased in terms of the irreconcilability between philosophical normativeness and 
historical descriptiveness. In support of the normative project, Ronald Giere has 
added that, at best, philosophy should be concerned with contemporary science: 
history is philosophically irrelevant (Giere 1973). 
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The advent of a more historically-minded philosophy of science in the late 
1960s only moves the “giveness" from without to within, from the context to the 
structure. Theories were endowed with a historical dimension at the expenses of 
their internal architecture. This is a consequence of the fact that, with the entering 
of history, the analysis moved up to a higher level. Philosophers lost interest in the-
ories as such and began to inquiry larger entities such as paradigms, research pro-
grams or research traditions that spanned longer periods of time. Logical Empiri-
cism and the Semantic View analyzed scientific theories in terms of their con-
stituents and investigated the manner in which they are combined together. By 
contrast, since the 1960s, philosophers began to favor the view of theories as “an-
swers to problems”. This evanescent conception makes theory parasitic on the no-
tion of problem. Instead of analyzing the theoretical structure, philosophers chose 
to produce a taxonomy of the possible (empirical and conceptual) problems and 
then to characterize theories as the corresponding answers.  5
But there is a deeper reason. To unfold it, let us consider for a moment a recent 
example. Olivier Darrigol argued that physical theories possess a “modular struc-
ture”, i.e. they are constituted of building blocks, or moduli, which are, in them-
selves, established pieces of theoretical work (Darrigol 2008). In creating a theory, 
scientists may use bits of Hamiltonian mechanics, classical optics, thermodynamics, 
statistical physics and so on, all arranged in a coherent structure. Darrigol’s view 
helps understand how theories are accepted and disseminated, but does not illu-
minate much their internal structure from an epistemological standpoint. In fact, 
the moduli are themselves theoretical bits taken as givens. On the other hand, Dar-
rigol’s is one of the best attempt a philosophically-minded historian of physics 
could try. The reason is contingent upon the development of philosophy of science 
in the 20th century. Among the upholders of Logical Empiricism and its immediate 
emanations, it was commonplace to hold the view that theories are accepted, dis-
seminated, and learned because of internal, structural reasons. To put it a bit bru-
 See for instance (Laudan 1977; Shapere 1984, 286-287).5
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tally, a theory is believed by its practitioners because is true, elegant, simple, well-
behaving, or just working. By contrast, if people believe a false, clumsy, abstruse 
theory, this must be due to some external factor such as ideology, social or per-
sonal interests, economic advantages, political agendas, and alike. History and so-
ciology can—and ought to— explain biases, deviations, and errors, while believing in 
truth does not need further explanation. The philosophy and history of science of 
the 1960s detected the fallacy behind this claim and moved resolutely to the op-
posite direction. They denounced internal factors as positivistic naivety and treated 
theories as a structural given. My point is that this radical reversal is as little benefi-
cial to our overall understanding of theories as the strict internalism of Logical Em-
piricism. 
Even this quick discussion of the main philosophical accounts should suffice to 
conclude, with Dudley Shapere, that “[t]here is today no completely—one is almost 
tempted to say remotely—satisfactory analysis of the notion of a scientific 
theory” (Shapere 1984, 112). My goal in the remainder of the paper is to provide 
an alternative. I argue that we have to think about theories in a way that allows us to 
combine their being social and historical activities with an analysis of their internal 
structure, which can produce some general, epistemological insights. 
4. A WORKING SPACE OF THEORIES 
4.1 The Dispensability of the Dogmas 
The previous survey shows that philosophical accounts seek for a difficult equi-
librium between rigorous arguments—often reached by formal methods—and the 
necessity to capture actual scientific practices in the present and the past. Initially, 
philosophers favored approaches based on logic or set theory able to lead to for-
mally correct conclusions. Those conclusions, however, resembled very little what 
scientists actually do. This criticism paved the way to historical- and cultural-orient-
ed approaches in which the emphasis moved on tacit knowledge, hand-on prac-
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tices, paradigms and so fort. The three dogmas are the result of the early phase in 
which formal methods ruled undisputed. However, when in the 1960s philoso-
phers began to relax some of the formal constraints and to pay more attention to 
history of science, they did not abandon the three dogmas. In fact, the history-ori-
ented philosophy of science reconfigured them to ultimately debunk the internal 
theoretical structure. The price paid to maintain the dogmas was a philosophical 
withdraw from the ambition of describing the architecture of theories. By contrast, 
my contention is simply that we should restore this ambition and discard the three 
dogmas. 
There is another possibility. One could instead discard the ambition of mirroring 
actual scientific practices and hold a strong normative stance for philosophy. In this 
case, the argument would go that one should distinguish neatly between describ-
ing scientific practices and providing norms concerning what science ought to be. 
These are two different cultural projects. The latter is philosophy’s main goal and 
problems crop up when it is mixed with the former, which instead belongs to histo-
ry of science. However, one moment’s reflection shows that this argument relies on 
a false dualism. One could draw a clearcut line between normative and descriptive 
projects only if it were possible to found the former either (i) on a set of a priori 
principles of rationality or (ii) on transcendental arguments. For, if one is not allow 
to derive scientific norms from actual scientific practices, then either they are im-
posed as a priori rules of rationality or it is proved that science cannot happen 
without them. Both strategies seem unfeasible at the moment. A more positive ar-
gument against the strong normativeness is the following. One should notice that 
scientific practices in the past and in the present enjoy a quite respectable amount 
of success. This seems to suggest that, at least partially, they approach the ideal of 
what a theory ought to be. From this perspective, the normative project is not in-
dependent of—let alone incompatible with—the description of historically located 
scientific practices, but it can build on them to elucidate their functioning and to 
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ameliorate their efficacy. This form of normativism is also compatible with my 
project of replacing the three dogmas with more suitable theses about theories. 
4.2 Beyond the Dogmas 
The popularity of the three dogmas has deeper roots than one can think at first 
sight. A closer investigation reveals that they are expressions of very natural philo-
sophical attitudes. The first dogma, for instance, embodies the usual strategy of 
characterizing the object of study in terms of its essence, what makes it what it ac-
tually is. The theoretical core is the theory’s innermost identity. Analogously, the 
picture of theory evolution as the refinement of auxiliary components respect to an 
unrejectable core embodies the model of the classical ontological accounts of be-
coming. Finally, the third dogma defines the subject matter of study as a well-
bounded object—even if only for mere analysis’ sake an attitude that, as I argue 
above, is rooted in scientific tradition. 
The problem with these natural attitudes is that theories are very peculiar ob-
jects. Theories are devices to produce a certain form of knowledge—i.e. theoretical 
knowledge—and philosophical accounts ultimately aim at obtaining theoretical 
knowledge about them. But the meta-theories hitherto proposed do not differ 
substantially from theories themselves. The study of theories is therefore prone to 
the dangers of reflexivity. What is more, philosophers have tackled this issue is a 
way that amplifies these dangers. They determine what a theory should look like to 
infer how it should work. This simple consideration contains the ultimate kernel of 
the inadequacy of the three dogmas. They lead to a hopelessly circular approach 
because one should have already a conception of what a theory is to elaborate a 
theoretical account of theories. In setting the epistemological arrow from essence 
to functioning, philosophical accounts objectify scientific theories and strip them of 
the only characterizing trait of which we have direct understanding: their being 
producers of a specific kind of knowledge. 
-  -17
The cumbersome circularity implicit in the three dogmas suggests that we 
should look at the issue from another perspective. We do not know what a theory 
is, but we do have a considerable amount of theoretical knowledge. We should 
therefore invert the epistemological arrow and try to clarify what a theory is 
through its being a knowledge producer instead of the other way round. To do 
that, we cannot simply construct a theory of theories, but instead we have to look at 
theories from the perspective of the practices that constitute them. This change of 
perspective would allow us to use reflectively the theoretical knowledge at our 
disposal to illuminate the functioning of theories. The procedure has two steps. 
First, we have to set up a workspace to conceptualize how the internal structure of 
a theory produces knowledge. Contrary to the usual philosophical accounts, this 
workspace does not aim primarily at telling us what a theory ultimately is. Instead, it 
serves as a platform of epistemic interaction between the various constituents of a 
theory. As I show below, it provides a minimal and very provisional answer to the 
question “what is a theory”, but this is not its main purpose. In fact, the workspace 
leaves open many questions about the specific way in which the theoretical con-
stituents interact and the consequences of this interaction for the production, ac-
ceptance, and dissemination of knowledge. The second step, therefore, consists in 
using the theoretical knowledge at hand in various fields to enrich the picture. 
Briefly said, the workspace makes possible a reflective interaction of our theoretical 
knowledge to illuminate the process of production of theoretical knowledge. Let 
us see how to flesh out this proposal. 
To begin with, recall my previous claim that a theory consists of three dimen-
sions: representational, transformational, and explanatory. These dimensions rep-
resent the parts of the epistemic job of knowledge production: symbolically repre-
senting the external world, transforming these representations to solve specific 
problems, and producing explanations of the observed behaviors. I now submit 
three new theses to replace the dogmas. In the next section I will discuss more 
thoroughly their consequences. My first thesis is the following: 
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(1) No theoretical constituent is epistemically neutral in principle. 
This claim means that each dimension contributes to the overall knowledge con-
tent of the theory or, at least, is not in principle excluded from such contribution. 
Note, however, an important point. Thesis (1) does not mean that each dimension 
works separately from the other and that their contributions add to the knowledge 
content. This view is compatible with the epistemic neutrality of the mathematical 
practices, which is contained in the first dogma. What (1) really means is that ele-
ments of different dimensions serve eminently different purposes, but they may 
also partially contribute to the other dimensions. Thus, for instance, certain mathe-
matical practices does not merely serve the purpose of transforming symbolic rep-
resentations, but they can also—at times—provide a representational content them-
selves. For this reason, I call (1) the thesis of the epistemic cooperation. Note also 
that (1) does not entail that each dimension ought to contribute to the others all 
the time. How the cooperation between dimensions occur depends on specific 
cases and, ultimately, on the choices of the theoretician. The precise dynamics of 
the  epistemic contributions is historically situated. 
The second thesis deals with a similar question and reads as follows: 
(2) Theoretical constituents do not have a preconceived arrangement. 
This claim is naturally related to (1). While (1) removes the notion of epistemic 
neutrality, (2) removes the center-periphery distinction, i.e. the morphology of the 
theory is more variegate than the usual core-belt structure. To detail this morphol-
ogy—which can change from theory to theory and from time to time—one has to 
shift the focus from where the knowledge is stored to how it is produced. It is the 
specific manner in which the theoretical dimensions cooperate that establishes 
what elements are more important, how they are arranged, and how they con-
tribute to the overall knowledge content. I call (2) the thesis of the complex mor-
phology. 
Finally, the third thesis: 
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(3) The process of production of theoretical knowledge depends (i) on the 
structure of the theory and (ii) on how this structure evolves in time and 
place. 
The idea behind this thesis is that not only the production of knowledge de-
pends on a situated epistemic cooperation between the dimensions and on a situ-
ated morphology, but also the constituents of the dimensions are historically, so-
cially, and culturally situated. Thus, (3) tells us that we cannot reduce the knowl-
edge content of a theory either to its internal structure, or to its specific history and 
cultural context. In fact, these two aspects interact because we cannot understand 
the epistemic cooperation between the dimensions without taking into account the 
historical determination of their constituents and we cannot understand their his-
torical evolution without taking into account how they cooperate. I call (3) the the-
sis of the two-sidedness of theoretical knowledge. 
Before discussing the workspace in more details, let us pause a moment to note 
the difference between theses (1)-(3) and the traditional accounts. Following the 
dogmas, philosophers usually made a series of reductivist choices. Either they 
choose to investigate the nature of a handful of fundamental laws, or they charac-
terize theory evolution as the combination of something that remains and some-
thing that changes. Theses (1)-(3) points at a completely different direction. The his-
toricity of a theory is built into the theoretical constituents themselves. Theories are 
cultural and historical entities not because they are immersed in a certain “context” 
and because some of their parts are replaced over time, but because they produce 
knowledge through the epistemic cooperation of historically and culturally situated 
practices. Furthermore, theses (1) and (2) suggest that also the way in which they 
cooperate  and their organization is itself historically and cultural situated. Taken 
together, theses (1)-(3) claim the intermingle of structural and historical factors in 
knowledge production.   
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4.2 Cooperating Dimensions 
Theses (1)-(3) define the general features of the workspace, but they still leave 
undetermined the details of the epistemic cooperation between dimensions. My 
contention is that these details cannot be established by means of abstract philo-
sophical arguments, but must be obtained from the theoretical knowledge at our 
disposal. However, we can further elaborate the concepts of theoretical dimen-
sions and epistemic cooperation. 
The representational dimension of a theory concerns its ability to depict the 
physical world by selecting relevant features and by expressing them symbolically. 
In other words, it creates a symbolic codification of the phenomenon under study. 
A codification is typically performed by means of concepts, principles, models, 
ideal objects, and alike. Thus, the motion of earth, sun, and moon is codified by the 
three-body model, the concepts of mass, velocity, force, orbital elements, the prin-
ciples of conservation of linear and angular momentum and so forth. It should be 
remembered, however, that these theoretical entities do not need to be exclusively 
representational. The transformational dimension concerns the manipulation of 
symbolic codifications to obtain other symbolic codifications by means of symbolic 
practices. The immediate purpose of these transformations is the solution of specif-
ic problems. Consider, to continue our example, the actual calculation of the rela-
tive motion of earth, sun, and moon. To predict the positions of the three heavenly 
bodies anytime in the future, one needs to formulate the equations of motion, to 
simplify them, possibly by coordinates transformations and integrals of motion, 
and to solve them by approximations or numerical methods. All these steps require 
specific mathematical techniques to turn a general symbolic codification into the 
calculation of the concrete behavior of a planet or a satellite. 
Finally, a theory must also explain phenomena, a function that goes beyond 
both representing the world and solving concrete problems. I have postponed the 
discussion of the explanatory dimension because it has a somewhat different sta-
tus. My claim is that the explanatory quality is a feature of the theory as a whole. 
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There is no space in this paper even for a sketchy overview of the literature on ex-
planation. At any rate, my goal here is not to provide a full-fledged theory, but only 
to lay out some very general requirements. To begin with, I take the explanatory 
dimension of a theory to give causal explanations.  I do not exclude that also other 6
accounts, such as the unification account, can be included in this framework.  I 7
submit that a theory yields an explanation of a phenomenon when it gives an epis-
temic story of this phenomenon with two crucial characteristics. First of all, it must 
be a causal story, a requirement that can be decomposed in two further conditions. 
(EX1) The theory gives a set of causal factors in terms of symbolic codifica-
tions of the features of the phenomenon. 
Conditions (EX1) states that the explanatory theory exhibits a representation of 
the features of the phenomenon that act causally, i.e., in Woodward’s terms, they 
are the variables that we need to manipulate if we want to provoke a causal differ-
ence in the phenomenon. The second condition reads: 
(EX2) The theory gives a mechanism relating the causal factors with the phe-
nomenon. 
To explain, a theory needs to tell us how to modify the causal factors to obtain a 
certain change in the ensuing phenomenon. Conditions (EX1) and (EX2) jointly 
give us a causal structure (in Woodward’s sense) and tell us why and how phenom-
ena happen. However not all the why-and-how explanations are also good expla-
nations. How good an explanation is does not entirely depend on satisfying condi-
tions (EX1) and (EX2). As pointed out by thesis (3), the knowledge content com-
bines structural and historical factors. I therefore add the following social-episte-
mological requirement: 
 On the theory of causal explanation I follow especially (Woodward 2003). According to Wood6 -
ward’s manipulability account, the variable X codifies a causal factor for the quantity codified by the 
variable Y if there is a possible intervention on X such that we can change the values of Y: “putting 
this in the form of a slogan, we can say that manipulability accounts are committed to the following: 
No causal difference without a difference in manipulability relations, and no difference in manipula-
bility relations without a causal difference” (Woodward 2003, 61).
 In fact, I do not think that the causal theory is incompatible with the unification approach; see, for 7
instance (Strevens 2004).
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(EX3) A good explanation for a community is an epistemic story that satisfies 
a set of historically, socially, and culturally situated requisites of the 
community. 
The acceptability of an explanation is a community-dependent property. Hence, 
it depends on conditions that the community has interiorized as part of its history 
and culture. To clarify this point I introduce another important concept. I have 
claimed that an explanation is an epistemic story of the phenomenon to be ex-
plained. As any narrative, an epistemic story is a story of a certain kind. In other 
words, it is organized around one of more epistemic tropes that establish what 
cognitive resources to mobilize, what concepts, mathematical techniques, and ar-
gumentative patterns to deploy to satisfy (EX1) and (EX2). Epistemic tropes are the 
constituents of the explanatory dimension. They might be methodological direc-
tives, scientific principles elevated to the rank of metaphysical norms, generalized 
concepts. Epistemic tropes characterize different kinds of explanatory stories. 
Mechanistic, evolutionary, field-theoretical, historical, functional explanations differ 
by the resources used, by the argumentative patterns adopted, by their social and 
cultural impact, all elements that depend on the epistemic tropes. It is now clear 
that (EX3) is a condition about the epistemic tropes. The rationale to accept, devel-
op, and disseminate an explanation changes from community to community and 
from time to time in relation to the conceptual and technical resources applied and 
the argumentative patterns used to align them. My point is therefore that part of 
the reasons to accept, interiorize, and disseminate a theory comes from the kind of 
epistemic story it tells: the standards to select cognitive resources, the argumenta-
tive patterns to align them, the inclusion or exclusion of possibilities, the reading of 
the meaning of the problem. 
The next step in my argument is to show how symbolic codifications, symbolic 
practices, and epistemic tropes cooperate to produce theoretical knowledge. Let 
us begin with the interrelation between representational and transformational di-
mensions.  As we have seen in the foregoing sections, philosophy of science has 
traditionally neglected the epistemic contribution of what I call symbolic practices. 
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Traditionally, they have been deemed as epistemically neutral. By contrast, my the-
sis (1) claims that they possess a substantial knowledge content beyond their abili-
ty to transform a symbolic codification into another. I suggest that symbolic prac-
tices contain an epistemic surplus that yields a certain amount of knowledge about 
the problem on which they are applied. The intuition behind this suggestion is that, 
as tools, symbolic practices must fit both our cognitive capabilities and the symbol-
ic codifications they act upon. This double fitting tells us something very general 
about the object of the transformation as well as about our cognitive capabilities, a 
kind of knowledge intrinsic in the use of the tools. For instance, the successful ap-
plication of convergent trigonometric series to a mechanical problem might sug-
gest that the problem has a periodic nature. This information is part of the fact that 
those mathematical practices help solve the problem. It is, roughly speaking, an-
other aspect of that fact. 
Note that, because of the double fitting the epistemic surplus incapsulated in 
the symbolic practices is not univocal and a priori, but it is always socially and his-
torically situated. Different actors can view the same symbolic practice in different 
ways at different times or emphasize one of the end of the fitting at the expenses 
of the other. Probabilistic tools are a notorious case in point. For some scientists, 
the successful use of probabilistic methods to solve a problem indicates that the 
phenomenon is intrinsically stochastic, whereas for others it can indicate a limita-
tion of our knowledge of the phenomenon. At times, the difference in reading the 
epistemic surplus depends on historical cases. An example is the different recep-
tions of special relativity. Einstein saw his mathematical techniques as telling some-
thing really important on simultaneity and the individual judgements of the order 
of physical events. Instead, for Herman Minkowski all that mathematical machinery 
revealed rather the deep geometrical blending of space and time and for Ebenez-
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er Cunningham it represented a clever extension of the treatment of electrostatic 
problems to a time-dependent situation.  8
A second and partially related point is that symbolic practices reveal a body of 
knowledge that is not included in the symbolic codification. They yields a very 
general information on the nature of the problem in terms of the conditions for its 
manipulability. This difference in the body of knowledge conveyed is the basis for 
the epistemic cooperation between representational and transformational dimen-
sions. To treat a theoretical problem, one has to negotiate between the type of in-
formation obtained by using certain concepts and certain practices until a satisfac-
tory combination is reached. The result is a center of structured practices and codi-
fications that deals with a specific problem in the overall architecture of the theory.  
A physical theory can contain several such centers, each serving a different func-
tion. They constitute the series of steps through which the theory solves partial 
problems to obtain its final goal. The way in which they are arranged is the mor-
phology of the theory and, as stated in thesis (2), it can assume complex forms. This 
bring us to the issue of the cooperation with the explanatory dimension. The epis-
temic trope shapes the explanatory story of the theory by laying down argumenta-
tive patterns into which symbolic codifications and practices can be aligned. Thus, 
the explanatory dimension makes sure that the various centers are coordinated to 
produce a consistent story of a certain kind. But it is important to realize that the 
construction of an epistemic story is itself the result of a bidirectional negotiation. 
To see why, consider that epistemic tropes can be expressed by different argumen-
tative patterns. For instance, if we want to assemble an explanation of a thermody-
namic phenomenon based on the idea of strict irreversibility, we can either prove 
that the reverse phenomenon is physically impossible, or we can define an entropy 
 The point of the concept of epistemic surplus is to insist on the relation between a body of knowl8 -
edge and the act of symbolic transformation. This does not mean that a certain knowledge content 
is invariably related with a certain practice. Quite the opposite, because as the examples show, the 
epistemic surplus must be situated into historical and cultural traditions where it can acquire differ-
ent forms. Again, the specification of these forms is a task for historical, cultural, psychological, and 
epistemological analysis.
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function and show that it increases monotonically. These are two different argu-
mentative patterns—incidentally, both adopted by Planck at different stages of his 
radiation theory—that embody the same epistemic trope. As a consequence, the 
realization of an epistemic trope involves a continuous negotiation between the 
argumentative patterns, the representational, and the transformational resources. 
Furthermore, symbolic codifications and practices effectively influence the con-
struction of the epistemic story as stated by the condition (EX3) above. Concepts, 
models, assumptions, and techniques have an important role in making an expla-
nation good or bad for a certain community. They actively determine a crucial 
component of the theoretical explanation. As an example, take the clash between 
upholders and critics of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
The heart of the disagreement mainly concerns the use of certain concepts (e.g. 
hidden variables) and/or mathematical techniques and the interpretation of their 
consequences on the overall epistemic story of quantum phenomena. 
This discussion of the epistemic cooperation leaves many questions unan-
swered. How should we conceptualize the epistemic surplus? How and when is it 
incapsulated into practices? What are the mechanism of negotiation between 
symbolic codifications and practices? What kind of morphologies are possible? On 
what conditions does the epistemic dimension drive the choice of concepts and 
practices and on what conditions it is constrained by them? The larger point of this 
philosophical project is that these and similar questions must be addressed by us-
ing the theoretical knowledge in our possession. Only the interaction between dis-
ciplines such as epistemology, cognitive science, psychology, sociology, social 
epistemology, philosophy of mind, history of science and cognate fields can help 
us understand how theories are created, accepted, communicated, and dissemi-
nated. Theories present themselves as complicated alignments of symbolic codifi-
cations and practices. Very much as in the case of cultural systems, one cannot 
hope to understand scientific theories from without. It is necessary to apply knowl-
edge from different sources and to be immersed in specific cases to unfold the 
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epistemic cooperation between dimensions, the morphology, the several intersec-
tions and interrelation, and their change over time. A theory must be deconstruct-
ed and deciphered using other theoretical knowledge. My workspace should serve 
as a post-dogmatic platform to ease this deconstruction. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The main point of this paper is that traditional accounts of theories, based on 
the three dogmas, have forced philosophers to choose between the analysis of the 
internal structure and the description of the historical evolution. My claim is that 
this choice can be avoided by changing our way to look at scientific theories. 
In the second part of the paper, I have supported the view that theories are to 
be taken essentially as knowledge producers. We should therefore concentrate on 
the process of generating knowledge as the result of an epistemic cooperation be-
tween three dimensions of the theory: representational, transformational, and ex-
planatory. I argue that we cannot establish what a theory is or ought to be by 
means of purely philosophical arguments. We need to use the wealth of theoretical 
knowledge at our disposal to clarify how theoretical knowledge actually works. 
The picture of theories emerging from this account is very different from the tra-
ditional one. Here theories are not well-defined and strongly structured assem-
blages of propositions or model. Instead, theories live in a web of texts and prac-
tices, their boundaries are porous, their internal morphology is ever-changing. 
They are cultural products whose epistemic dynamics, and therefore their norma-
tivity, can be illuminated only by keeping in mind their inherent historicity. 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